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This paper supports the position that interpretation in the visual and performing arts is
fundamentally different from other disciplines. It argues that 'interpretation' should not be
constrained by the requirement of unambiguous language and that practice-based
research should strive to demonstrate its findings by methods most appropriate to the
mode of practice in question. More specifically it responds to the question: 'Are
unambiguous research outputs in the arts possible or desirable?' and argues that
ambiguous research outputs are both desirable and inevitable. The paper explores what it
is, more precisely, that might be ambiguous. With reference to the fallacies of ambiguity
and Jacques Derrida's procedures of questioning assumptions at every level of meaning
construction, we attempt to distinguish between knowledge and understanding and
between questions and outputs. We suggest that the clarification of terms and context can
differentiate between fallacies and valid applications of doubt and ambiguity. We discuss
the problems associated with ambiguity in terms of knowledge and practice-based
research and suggest that practice can utilise ambiguity in the pursuit of knowledge. We
propose that it is possible to embed an argument in practice and to demonstrate an
exchange between practice, value and theory and that it is ambiguous questions, which
are not desirable.
We are talking about fine art practice in the broadest sense, and which we understand as
not necessarily resulting in an artefact or anything unambiguous. Our assumption is that
any variety of practice will be a discursive construction that embodies values and theories
and must conform to some order of language and structure (e.g. modernism,
conceptualism), which (in the context of research) will always require the question: what
is the premise for this structure and this practice? We promote the hypothesis that art
practice, as discursive expression and defined by its manner of presentation, can display a
manner of thinking that makes a different, but equivalent, contribution to cultural debate
(and to written analysis), particularly in the way it can challenge assumptions and
conventional expectations of meaning and objectivity. Our ultimate aim is to proceed
from the convention of interpreting art, as merely illustrating social, political and
philosophical ideas discussed in other disciplines or situating practice within some
context, to investigating practice (images, objects and performances) as provoking
thought and discourse (philosophically, culturally, politically) and producing forms of
knowledge. The challenge for practice-based research is: what is that knowledge and how
is that knowledge and ideology understood? This is potentially a huge project and, as we
have found, a taxing one. This paper is more specifically concerned with identifying why
'ambiguous research outputs' might be a problem and with demonstrating their
desirability. Our aim is to establish the legitimacy of ambiguity and doubt.
A usual requirement of the PhD process is to clarify any ambiguity of terms used. We
attempt here to identify confusions that derive from the terms ambiguous and ambiguity
and their use, and to locate more precisely where the ambiguity lies. Is it possible to
distinguish different locations of ambiguity? Does the ambiguity reside, for example, in
linguistics or inexplicable concept? This is a difficult task as the subtleties of ambiguity
are extensive and language itself is ambiguous, both lexically and structurally (Bach). In
everyday language, vagueness and ambiguity are seemingly the same, however they can
be said to function differently in critical thinking. Something is ambiguous if it has at
least two meanings that make sense in context, but vague if the intended meaning is
unclear in application or context. What is crucial to the question of ambiguity, and to
unravelling prejudices that derive logically from traditions, is the clarity or
misappropriation of context, terms and usage. Imprecise uses of language lead to
incorrect patterns of reasoning (fallacies of ambiguity), which are logically false but
appear to be true. Plato's dialogic device and the logic derived from fallacies of ambiguity
provide models with which to question the articulation and validation of outputs and
whether they are acceptable or not. The notion of fallacies originates in logical reasoning
and philosophy's concern to determine any interference with getting at the truth; fallacies
present obstructions to establishing the truth.  Fallacies arise when a premise from one
discipline moves into another and, if adopted without question, can develop into a
convention. In the context of art, the term ambiguity inherits the association with fallacy
and falsehood and directs us to a confusing field of conflated ideas: truth and/or fiction
and/or art, aesthetics and/or art practice, philosophy and/or aesthetics. 
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The usefulness of fallacies of ambiguity is that they focus the confusion between terms,
the confusions about fallacies and the confusions about ambiguity in the context of
practice-based research. The following example highlights the potential confusion
concerning process and output (product). Having been asked to determine whether a
piece of work addresses the question 'what is bad (good) drawing?' a respondent proceeds
to assume, firstly, that what is required is to determine whether the drawing presented is
either good or bad, secondly, that the starting premise must be that nothing about a
drawing is self evident and thirdly, and logically, that any number of factors subsequently
influence that decision and therefore, without written amplification by the maker of the
drawing, no comment can be made. This logic, although legitimate within its own
premise, demonstrates process-product ambiguity as it confuses drawing, as a questioning
process, with drawing as output.  In the context of logical argument and the search for
truth, there are five basic linguistic fallacies of ambiguity as defined by Aristotle: those of
accent, amphiboly, composition, division and equivocation. 1 Here we have made use of
the fallacy of equivocation, which results when a single key term with two or more
meanings is used in the same argument, as with drawing-as-verb and drawing-as-noun.
Having established the confusion derived from process-product ambiguity, we need to
distinguish between two questions: the validity of ambiguous process and the validity of
ambiguous output - between the research process and the outputs produced as evidence. 
For the purposes of this paper we shall be referring to a fictional research output, which
appears as a glass of water. The choice of a glass of water references its various use as
subject matter from Jean Baptiste Siméon Chardin's Glass of Water and Coffee Pot
(1760) to Michael Craig Martin's An Oak Tree (1973), and acknowledges Kristina
Neidderer's use of the water glass to explore the role of artefacts as data and evidence in
practice-based research (2004). A dialogue that is almost entirely a continuous series of
fallacious questions and answers/statements and which appears as facetious, but contains
notable examples of ambiguities, might go something like this:
A: That glass of water looks sublime is it [part of] your research?
B: Possibly ... hmmm ... the sublime glass of water. This glass of clear liquid (water) is
my practice and I practise research so it follows ...
A: What ... that this glass of water is research?
B: Well I have taken photographs of the glass of water but they were not developed. 
A: Oh ... and am I right in thinking that there is water in the glass and that therefore there
is always water in the glass?
B: Yes there is water in the glass 
A: Trees need water to grow so is this glass of water growing?
B: Like an oak tree?
A: Well I would like to think that it is as solid as a glass of water
[Pause]
A: So is it begging the question? 
[Continued]
Clearly, confusion with the different use of terms can occur within a discipline, which can
be further compounded by the application of terminologies from processes of thought
established by other disciplines (e.g. science). This can be construed as a
misappropriation of terms - a fallacy of ambiguity in itself - of equivocation. In taking on
the terms methodology, knowledge, evidence from the sciences, we should be careful not
to also take on the assumptions associated with those terms from those of other
disciplines. The question 'Are unambiguous research outputs in the arts possible or
desirable?' is grammatically (and ambiguously) complex and implicitly carries a negative
connotation. What is the problem with ambiguity?  If ambiguity means 'undetermined, of
intermediate or doubtful nature, indistinct,' not defined as any one thing, is this then not
desirable? If the purpose of research is to establish knowledge and insight, why is it a
problem when outputs generate a number of interpretations, argument or controversy?
Can one determine research outputs as undesirably ambiguous if in the process and of
necessity, they encounter ambiguity? The desire for the removal of ambiguous outputs
arises from a concern for transparency in the validation of practice as research and is
dependent on principles grounded in the traditions of empirical research and their
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subsequent suppositions. Empirical methodologies require us to dispel uncertainty by
translating experience into logical processes and categorical and oppositional definitions
in order to construct a form of knowledge. Following this traditional mode, David
Durling (2000) states:
Research seeks primarily to extract reliable knowledge from real or artificial worlds, and tries to
articulate that knowledge in such a way that others may reuse it. This supposes that the results of
research will have been sufficiently abstracted and generalized 
A traditional PhD requires verification and evidence, transparency and communication.
Modernist traditions of art practice fly in the face of this; art is expected to be original in
the sense of new and untraditional, to break the rules, to provoke, to invoke doubt and
disturbance or to encompass some sort of subjective vision. This then presents four
problems at least: the communication of research outcomes, the question of truth and
verifiability, the presence of doubt and uncertainty, the presence of both objective and
subjective content. There is a mismatch and, in our anxiety to justify practice as being
validly acceptable by the research community, we have developed procedures that are
recognisable. In so doing, it is possible that we have adopted some assumptions resulting
from logical reasoning, which have in turn have become immutable research principles
and fixed conventions, rather than developing alternative or difficult hypotheses which
step towards something (Plato, 2003: 239).
A PhD demands a question and responses to that question, but as Michael Biggs (2003)
usefully states, research in the humanities can only offer interpretations and not answers
to problems. Practice-based research has developed conventional methods with which to
reduce the ambiguity of interpretation. If it is defined as prioritizing 'experiential content'
over 'cognitive content', which is then assumed to be problematically inaccessible, then
we have the ensuing problem of communicating that content (Biggs 2004: 2). A number
of models endorse a cognitive reflexive account (usually by the practitioner), which either
situates the practice in relation to wider cultural issues, or investigates that experiential
content, thereby confirming the understanding of experiential knowledge as private and
one that has to be translated or represented (e.g. Barrett, 2007). As Biggs points out, this
can permit accounts of personal development with limited interest to the wider
community; his differentiation between art as cultural practice and art as personal
development is useful (2003). Biggs then considers the problems encountered in
translating experiential content into words, practice into explicit arguments. This
translation method works in both directions; practice is also required to convert linguistic
aspects (theories) into non-linguistic modes of practice (Biggs, 2004: 13). Both Biggs and
Anne Pakes reference Gilbert Ryle's distinction between practical and explicit
knowledge, which Pakes pursues for possibilities of reasoned justification for 'intelligent'
practice (Pakes, 2004: 2). However, practical reasoning also appears to require linguistic
articulation. This remains a problem. Biggs indicates that the transition cannot always be
made easily as language cannot adequately describe experience (2004: 6) and Pakes,
concerned to find a reasoning 'embedded in the activity itself' states: 'as soon as that
articulation happens, it begins to assume the guise of a conceptual order imposed from
outside the action per se.' (Pakes, 2004: 2)
Biggs (2003) proceeds: 'if the aim of research is to communicate knowledge,' we should
reduce what is uncontrollable and constrain extrinsic factors in order to communicate
efficiently. Communication requires the exchange of information, a sense of mutual
understanding, a means of access. To communicate requires us to convey a thought by
speech writing or gesture (perhaps) but does not prescribe specifically linguistic access.
In a research context, as a means of giving definition, giving context, or stating some
position, communication is achieved most efficiently using words, but art practice may
provide access by other methods. Rothko, for example, talking about his works as
'facades' with doorways and windows suggests a more ambiguous means of access. 2
Perhaps the term dissemination, which Biggs uses interchangeably with communication
(2004: 2), allows more appropriate access to practice outputs. As we have seen, with the
likelihood of process-product ambiguity, the many constituents of the research process
are bound to contribute confusion. One could say then, that following the distinction
between process and output, what is necessary is that the process, the question, the
rationale and the context needs to be communicable and transparent, rather than the
requirement of an unambiguous output. 
[Continued]  3
B: I am presenting this glass of water as a research output
A: How do you communicate that?
B: My practice does not aim to communicate
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A: How do you communicate that? What describes it as a glass of water?
B: Its properties ... the glass of water describes itself.  Colourless and translucent ... it
modifies surroundings and tells us about itself  ... [Pause] ... even as condensation or
steam? 
A: What does this glass of water say?
B: It says that it is The Glass of Water and always needs a surface on which to rest. It
makes sense of itself. If the liquid and glass were separated we would have a puddle. A
liquid in a glass make sense of one another. 
A: How is that communicated?
[Sound off] Plop!
A: What does that mean?
[Sound off] Splash!
A: Is it consistent with its coherence?
[Sound off] Crash!
B: The glass enables the water to be accessible; it defies gravity and gives meaning and
now after the crash it is no longer ... 
[Pause]
A: Fulfilled?
[Continued]
We begin to see how assumptions and expectations of practice-based research become
conventions. It is assumed that interpretations need to be communicated and if practice is
submitted alongside written interpretation, then the practice can be used most easily as a
method of expansion to illustrate the interpretation. We question whether this method
will fully utilise the potential of practice. An alternative attitude sees the possibility that
practice and linguistic argument each tackle the question differently - each according to
their method. This attitude attempts to thoroughly and positively use the practice to
answer the question, rather than reflecting upon practice in terms of its process or the
practitioner's experience. Pakes's search for a validation of practice-as-research as a form
of knowledge, raises a number of useful instances and possibilities. She looks at the
relationship between knowledge and practical reasoning processes and asks what is the
mode of knowledge that art produces, how is it disseminated and do the outcomes have
primacy over the process? She aligns 'action' with art practice for the purposes of
exploring the whereabouts of knowledge and considers Aristotle's 'practical syllogism', as
opposed to 'theoretical syllogism', as a reasoning that may offer justification of an action
(practice). This seems promising as it indicates an appropriate reasoning for a
demonstration through action/practice as knowledge. Pakes asserts art practice as
'underwritten by a logic that emerges in and through the activity itself,' which
characterises action as a mode of knowledge 'with its own distinctive logic', not
dependent on deductive or inductive reasoning. 'In this view, action neither requires
theoretical explanation nor functions to illustrate insights acquired theoretically: rather it
is in itself intelligent.' (Pakes: 2) Her argument persuades us that the convention of
documenting or justifying practice has developed by default. 
However, this does not mean that by establishing practice as 'intelligent' or by
questioning the documentation of process, one logically dismisses verbal argument that
can parallel practice; rather it questions what that verbal articulation contributes. We do
not advocate a PhD model with non-linguistic content only, nor one that doesn't involve a
substantial amount of writing 4 and we do not dispute the need for the research process to
include contextualisation and methodology (Biggs 2003) and agree that one should not
merely adopt a model but, by critical and analytical means, provide a rationale (Biggs
2004: 11). But further to this, if practice is going to be useful, we advocate methods that
avoid resorting to explanation of the practice and that allow practice-as-demonstration, to
take precedence over practice-as-illustration. Extending Biggs's statement that practice
can only generate interpretations, logically then, practice, which invites layers of visual
connotation and assigns meaning in completely different contexts or creates hitherto
unseen usages, must be ambiguous. One could say that ambiguity is a requisite of
practice-based research and further, that art needs to be a fallacy of ambiguity itself in
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order to avoid truth by logical means. We need to establish however what the practice
contributes, and specifically the possibilities of ambiguity, in addition to
contextualisation. We want practice, through its particular means of representation, to
develop the argument and this is what taxes us and causes problems for aesthetics or what
sort of art it is or what sort of research it is. One can construct linguistic arguments. One
can construct non-linguistic demonstrations. As it is more likely to provide a series of
propositions, a more difficult question is whether the practice is required to demonstrate
an argument. 
The range of terminology (practice-as-research, art-as-research, research-into-practice,
practice-based research etc.) is problematic as each mode attempts to qualify and
implicitly justify itself by referring to its method.  To use any of these terms without
clarification engenders confusion and fallacy. An ultimate aim may be to dispense with
the qualifying terms practice-based or practice-led (as qualifying adjectives) and refer to
arts research that may be confident enough to assume that practice may be validly
utilised to demonstrate the issues in question. At any rate, in seeking an ideal, the arts
based research community need not be resigned to adopting compromising terminology.
In many ways ambiguity can only exist if we (the research field, the community of users,
the audience) don't agree about definitions and meaning. 
[Continued] 5
B: I am presenting The Glass of Water as a research output.
A: Yes you've almost said that before ... so for the purposes of clarity would it be
appropriate to qualify The Glass of Water as [your] [the] practice as research or as
perhaps your research into practice? 
B: Maybe
A: Practice ... is that based, led, integrated or aligned?
B: Maybe
A: Definitely? 
B: Definitely [,] Maybe 
[Continued]
There are two points at issue here that keep discussion circulating around a justification
of practice-based research: the question of multi-faceted outcomes and interpretations and
the question of knowledge and what that might be. If we bracketed off the conclusion that
practice cannot produce evidence in the terms expected of the sciences, then where do we
go from here? Perhaps we do need another terminology. Ultimately we need to move on
from the question of whether practice represents knowledge and ask how does practice
demonstrate knowledge using its own representational structures (e.g. an image)?  The
Western tradition of distinguishing between theory (the domain of knowledge) and
practice  (interpreted as its application or techne) perpetuates a number of assumptions,
which confuse any development of knowledge that understands practice as being defined
by its manner of presentation or that merges practice and theory. 6 
In order to build an argument that supports ambiguous outputs and to move toward
locating that knowledge, we need to explain a shift in understanding. We have established
that the humanities present interpretations or alternative perspectives with which to view
an issue or question. Roland Barthes (1977) describes any 'work' that generates meaning
as initiating a 'methodological field.' If we consider a practice output in these terms, its
extension can be found in discourse, contemplation, and perhaps even argument (Barthes,
1977: 155). Subsequently Barthes's term 'text' refers to the discourse invoked by any such
'work' (piece of writing, artefact, film, image, performance, space). Nicholas Davey
(2006) suggests that Hans-Georg Gadamer's term 'subject matter' (the matter that
concerns us) can provide a focus for both theoretical and practice-based methodologies.
Gadamer interprets the Greek term theoria as a procedure 'without a specific end' and
theoros as a process with an emphasis that is not on knowledge or opposing theories, but
in encountering relationships within networks of meaning (Davey: 26). Both these
conceptions of understanding suggest that practice and its outputs extends to all that they
provoke, however ambiguous. Mieke Bal's approach to research sidesteps direct address
to the object and focuses on the concept instead, which extends beyond clear categories
(Bal, 2002: 29). This approach operates more in the way of questioning subject matter
(practice), encouraging a process of flexible encounter, what she calls 'framing' an object
(practice) historically, culturally and differently (134).
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Our knowledge of scientific principles does not change with re-examination but
re-examination of ideas does change our understanding (Foucault, 1998: 311). And
histories and contexts change, requiring us to ask: what attitude and perspective shape
this knowledge? The meaning of any-thing changes in different locations and time and
thereby the conception of knowledge evolves. Michel Foucault reminds us to ask: What
does one bring to the analysis? And to what effect? How does one account for this
position? What are the laws governing this particular discourse? What validates these
ideas? (Foucault 1998: 314) It is a process that considers knowledge to accommodate
context, to be something besides that of a physical fact and attempts to set aside bias and
assumptions. In contrast to the logic of defining oppositional categories, if we understand
practice as a means to invoke cultural discourse, then practice can be seen as operating
within a 'field' of knowledge. In these terms, the notion of knowledge has become fluid,
unstable and various (Bal 2002: 136).
And in order to argue the desirability of ambiguous research outputs, we're looking for a
justification for digression and simultaneity and the ambiguous location of knowledge -
for thinking that advocates simultaneity and possibilities of doubt. If we accept that art
practice is but part of a wider cultural debate, it is not difficult to find support and models
of thinking for our position. In questioning logical reasoning and the mechanics of
representation and meaning, Derrida (1973) uses a rhetorical means of displaying
simultaneity, for example in his neologism différance. Différance, as it conflates
difference (the spatial) and deferral (the temporal), represents a decentring dynamic,
which disturbs the logic of diegesis and definition and encourages dialogue and
dispersal.  Derrida reminds us that a logical conception of the world is not necessarily
common sense and celebrates the logical absurdities in texts as a necessary consequence
of their disturbance. Logical truths and trust in certainty are dependent on the notion of an
entity, entire unto itself, and separated from time and thought in its constitution, a thing
that has an essential nature that does not change. The dynamic of différance challenges
the distinction between form and subject (matter), which persists, but is somehow now
inadequate in the context of contemporary practices. Différance necessitates a reflection
on meaning in the visibility of a text (word, performance or image) itself and promotes
the non-oppositional nature of meaning in the possibility of multi-faceted and
simultaneous meaning. This gesture of visuality shifts our manner of understanding from
a translation of text, governed by the logical progression of verbal language, toward a
conceptual framework that can grasp the scope of an idea visually or performatively; it is
significant in the way that we apprehend experience, understand an idea and formulate
what we call knowledge. 
In negotiating the territory of what appears to us as contradictory, much of Derrida's
writing addresses that which is contrary to itself, inconsistent or oxymoronic (where
contradictory terms are combined) as it uncovers the paradoxical nature implicit in the
assumptions of thinking. What we might have understood as contradiction, in the sense of
opposition or denial is but another expression of difference (Derrida, 1993). No one
meaning is privileged over another and any text offers signification in a number of
directions simultaneously, so that 'this' or 'that' are no longer opposed, nor even
equivalent, but are different (Johnson, 1981: xiii). As Derrida's premise of différance
embodies apparently digressive directions, temporally and spatially, and asserts
difference over identity and certainty, it insists that this disruption is present in any
signifying act (visual or verbal). His expansion on aporia (unpassable path, impasse, not
knowing where to go) introduces doubt and incorporates plausible possibilities that are
inconsistent or cannot be concluded (Derrida, 1993: 20). Thereby as soon as one meaning
is established, it is differentiated from others, which unlocks further possibilities that are
different again. One cannot simply overturn an existing position with one that opposes it.
The co-existence of different interpretations obstructs a logic that insists on 'either/or' and
signals the possibility of any number of modes of being or diverse elements that may be
simultaneous (temporally and spatially), and 'absolutely heterogeneous' (Johnson: xv),
but not oppositional. This approach to understanding insists on a shift in perspective that
focuses on what else is possible and encourages apparently incongruent or absurdly
associated elements (visual or conceptual) to co-exist, rather than a reduction to binary
opposition. 
As an example of practice, Derrida's Right of Inspection (1989), demonstrates the reading
of photographs as an active dialogue between the photograph and the reader that is
changing and contradictory. His analysis of Marie-Francois Plissart's photographic
sequence takes the form of a contradictory speculation, which allows every detail to have
significance and each participant to have a voice. He steers us away from a definitive
account and demonstrates methods of looking and understanding through his questioning
of implicit interpretations. His procedures for looking perform his thinking about
meaning, and demonstrate the mediation of perception by thinking and association and
what one sees as entirely imaginary, symbolic and inseparable from perception. Hence
'there never was any 'perception'' (Derrida, 1973: 103). It is typical of the rhetorical
performance that demonstrates his critique through the manner of his writing; his
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theoretical position is inseparable from his expression. His rhetoric holds the meaning in
the very structure and expression of the writing (practice) by using words as a place of
ambivalence rather than definition. Referring to visual works as 'mute tableaux,' he
puzzles over the contextual mutability of words and their potential promiscuity, the
impossibility of interpretation and the consequent ''drama' of the glasses, of the broken
glass,' and 'the multiple scene of the drinking glass that is shattered.' (Derrida, 1989:
18-23)
Numerous forms of art practice, sometimes referred to as postmodern, exemplify
Derrida's questioning of signification. Michael Phillipson (1985) describes Philip
Guston's painting as breaking with the belief that painting's take us nearer to things in
themselves - to their inner meaning (truth). Michael Craig Martin's 'interview' discussing
the An Oak Tree (1973) demonstrates (as a practice) the critical issue of intention for art
practice and its meaning. John Smith's A Girl Chewing Gum (1976) demonstrates the
ambiguity of documentary better than any theorising text. Joseph Kosuth articulates
similar concerns of differentiation to Derrida and demonstrates art as a form of theory in
practice (One and Three Chairs, 1965). They each embody changes in attitudes to critical
thinking and representation, marking a significant point of transition. Art practices can
encompass a complexity of speculation, only constrained if explained in words. For
instance, Cornelia Parker's objects transfigure process: a wedding ring that circles a room
(Wedding Ring Drawing (circumference of a living room) (1996) refers to the process of
its extension and its possibilities of physical materiality; a silver spoon extended to the
length of the Niagara Falls (Measuring Niagara with a Teaspoon, (1997); a shed,
transmuted by an act, reconstitutes its shedness ('Cold Dark Matter: An Exploded View
(1991) or (Hanging Fire (Suspected Arson), (1999). Perceptions and levels of materiality
are opened up by technical process and demonstrate the potential of the material and
signification in its reconstitution. One reality is shattered to present another reality. As
artworks, they are definitely ambiguous and they extend the possibility of material,
process or thinking by demonstration. If we imagine the examples of practice above as
'research outputs,' they are both ambiguous and valid, as they each address philosophical
and/or material questions; they can be discussed, but they also contribute aspects that do
not equate with verbal translation. The visual and experiential does not necessarily need
to illustrate verbal text or require verbal explanation. Yet, have these attitudes been
assimilated by practiced-based methodology? Following Kaprow (Allan), Kosuth and
Koons (Jeff), the discontinuous space of practice is surely firmly established as more than
artefact. Guston's desire to 'include more,' which 'comprises one's doubts about the object,
plus the problem, the dilemma, of recognising it' (Phillipson: 154) approaches a practice
that acknowledges doubt and disturbance as its premise. Our suggestion is that invoking
doubt is positive. Biggs (2004: 14) acknowledges a 'dynamic relationship between
context, question, method, answer and audience.' Can we extend this dynamic to
encompass that of différance and one that invokes doubt and aspects of
not-understanding. Rather than looking for knowledge 'embodied' in the artefact, should
we look rather for an understanding in the dynamic (relationships) invoked by the object/
practice?
An 'emerging theory of interpretation' needs to acknowledge its fundamentally different
dynamic of doubt, differentiation and ambiguity, if it is going to establish different and
valid forms of knowledge. It needs to accommodate an attitudinal shift that understands
knowledge as something fluid and not easily contained. The suggestion that outputs are
undesirably ambiguous invites the question: so what is acceptable meaning in arts
research? Meaning is not only explained by definition, classification or generalisation.
Tracing words, concepts and their travels between complex theories and ordinary
language is never simple (Bal, 2002), but can open up the capacity for creative and
unpredictable dimensions found in word play, humour and practice. It is possible that the
phrase 'ambiguous research outputs' is the result of a fallacy of ambiguity and thereby
unsustainable. And established logical procedures that appeal to common practice for
their validation can be changed. Derrida's general project, questioning how we
comprehend thought, language and meaning, undermines our perpetual dependence on
polarities. In its wake, any research, in regarding the desire for certainty and definition,
must at least consider the field of assumptions upon which it is based. How can one
subsequently deny the co-existence of different directions emerging from any one thing
or that they should be embraced? Is this then ambiguity? Or is it better described as
digressive or various or aporetic? Rather than eliminating ambiguity, what might be the
benefits of adopting digression and aporia as a principle? If, in the visual and performing
arts, we can establish that different interpretations and meaning are inevitable and
desirable, so ambiguity becomes fundamental in the pursuit of knowledge. 
In reconsidering the validity of research outputs, we must recognise what we assume as
essentially validating an ambiguous practice-output: that practice must contribute to
answering the question. Demonstrations of ambiguous possibilities can sustain scrutiny if
they distinguish between ambiguity and vagueness and between the research output,
which may have several directions or layers, and the research question/content/context,
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which must be clearly outlined. The application of key terms needs to be clarified and
unambiguous, the research outputs do not. If the research methodology follows the
rigorous process outlined by Biggs: that the methods are clearly thought out; have a clear
rationale and demonstrate informed and aware decision-making strategies; that there is a
clear outline to the framework, context and language used; that the discourse outlines
what the implications of the question are, what impacts on that question and how it might
be answered - then ambiguous outputs have to be seen as valid. We must be more precise
about what the practical content and the written content each contribute. Biggs's reference
to the dynamic relationship between the different dimensions of research is indicative in
moving toward a more assertive methodology for arts research. However, in moving
forward, we are left with a number of questions for further consideration:  
[Continued]
[B, now alone, addresses The Glass of Water] 
How do I [Practice: a practitioner] enact critique through visual or performative
formats? 
Silent reply [non verbal] 
B: How do I engage with objects, images and events to interrogate the different and
continuous arguments they embody? 
Silent reply [non verbal] 
B: How do experiential practices present ideas in ways that are specific to their form?  
Silent reply [non verbal] 
B: How can experiential practices be said to embody some sort of knowledge ... how can
this knowledge be sustained as a resource?
[Fade out and continued]
Rather than perpetuating the divisions between practice and theory, we can utilise the
tensions that emerge from a practice that attempts to demonstrate theory in and through
its delivery; both practice and theory can encompass purpose, different kinds of
knowledge, experience and understanding.  Rather than situating practice or explaining
what practice is commonly termed about, we can consider art as an active dimension of
processing, visualising and embodying thinking and knowledge. Both Davey and Pakes
use Gadamer's discussion to negotiate a way to consider practice as subject matter and
knowledge and Gadamer possibly offers a source for further investigation in asserting
meaning in the practice output itself. Gregory Ulmer's heuretics (1994) might suggest
alternative methodologies to those driven by hermeneutic theories in apprehending
practice and more appropriate approaches pertinent to multi-faceted practices that
question and provoke via digression. Pakes usefully emphasises the autonomous potential
of practice in whatever mode it presents itself, rather than focusing on the artist's
reflexivity or 'experiential feeling' requiring translation. She asserts that artworks 'as
autonomous structures' can move us 'towards a participation in the work's play-structure,'
(Pakes: 6) which may be ambiguous and maintain a fluid, simultaneous dispersal of
meaning.
We emphasise the potential in utilising practice and ambiguous outputs to demonstrate
thinking. The precise scrutiny of how different modes of practice can address
objects/ideas differently from the written word and present alternative, and more
digressive, forms to that of rational, objective and linear synthesis must be the subject of
further papers. For now we concern ourselves with the question of locating ambiguity, in
whatever form, more precisely. Moving methodologies in arts research forward, we
emphasise the need to recognise, firstly, the different locations of any ambiguity involved
and secondly, where any assumptions deriving from fallacies occur. We assert the
equivalence of practice with verbal discussion and that arts research should aim to
demonstrate, through the considered use of both practice and verbal articulation, the 'field'
of possibilities that is being questioned. 
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Endnotes
 1 Aristotle was both the first formal logician codifying the rules of correct reasoning, and
the first informal logician cataloguing types of incorrect reasoning, namely, fallacies. He
was both the first to name types of logical error, and the first to group them into
categories in his Sophistical Refutations (Sophistici Elenchi) 350 BC, which identified
thirteen fallacies (12 + 1) as follows:
Linguistic fallacies: Accent, Amphiboly, Equivocation, Composition and Division ('two
sides of the same coin'), Figure of Speech;
Non-linguistic fallacies: Accident, Affirming the Consequent, In a Certain Respect and
Simply, Ignorance of Refutation, Begging the Question, False Cause, Many, Questions
 2 Miguel López-Remiro (ed.) Mark Rothko: Writings on Art, Yale University Press,
working papers in art and design, volume 5 http://sitem.herts.ac.uk/artdes_research/papers/wpades/vol5/jt...
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2005, p.xiii cites Rothko speaking at a conference at the Pratt Institute, 1958: 'My
pictures are indeed facades... Sometimes I open one door one window or two doors and
two windows... There is more power in telling little than in telling all.' 
 3 This dialogue references the demonstration of Bang in: 'Art and Art-like', a paper given
by James Ming-Hsueh Lee (PhD candidate Loughborough University) at the in-house
postgraduate research conference LUSAD, July 2008.
 4 Loughborough University guidelines for Practice Based Research Degrees: 'A research
degree submission with a practice element is designed to accommodate the idea that not
all knowledge is best represented and communicated in written form.' And: 'The written
element of the submission is expected to be normally 40,000 words in length.' 
 5 At present, LUSAD guidelines for 'PhD by Practice' outline four models: practice
based, practice led, practice aligned and practice integrated
 6 Pakes (2004: 3) further explores the complex distinctions between techne, phronesis,
praxis and poesis. They can be seen to categorise practice in different ways according to
who is translating and hen and in what context it is being translated. 
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